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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
C & J INDUSTRIES, INC., 
a corporation, A. ROBERT 
COLLINS and GLADE N. 
JAMES, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
EDWARD O. BAILEY and 
RUTH c. BAILEY, his wife, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16648 
This is a contract dispute. It revolves around the 
operation and effect of a particular clause of a real estate 
contract between the parties to this action. That clause 
is Paragraph 3(a) and it reads as follows: 
In the event Buyer desires to sell or assign, 
transfer or convey Buyer's rights under this 
contract or Buyer's interest in said premises, 
then and in that event, the Buyer must pay 
in full the outstanding balance on the con-
tract prior to said transaction. 
It is the position of Plaintiffs-Respondents that 
l) the terms of Paragraph 3(a) have not been violated, and 
2) the facts of this case do not operate to accelerate payments 
under the contract to the contract seller (Appellants). 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 2 -
Appellants contend 1) that the facts trigger 
acceleration of all payments under the contract, and 2) 
Respondents' failure to pay off the contract in full, having 
accelerated all payments, constitutes a material breach. 
STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS 
Respondents filed a declaratory judgment action 
with the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
Utah, seeking, among other things, a declaration that the 
Respondent C & J Industries, Inc., be permitted to continue 
to make monthly payments under the contract as originally 
agreed and that the facts of the case did not operate to 
accelerate all future payments to become immediately due and 
owing. Appellants filed an answer to the Complaint, but did 
not counterclaim. 
Inasmuch as there is no dispute of fact in this 
case, each party filed a motion for summary judgment. 
The issues and law were extensively briefed. Res-
pondents filed a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment (TR. 30-39) and Plaintiffs' Supplemental 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (TR. 57·1 
Appellants filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motio: 
for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Supplemental Memorandum 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (TR. 70-76), and 
Memorandum (TR. 77-83). 
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On !'1ay 21, 1979, both Plaintiffs' and Defendants' 
motions were heard by the Honorable Christine M. Durham. 
The court reviewed the initial memorandums cf law filed in 
support of the motions, and concluded that the parties should 
be provided an opportunity to research and brief the law regard-
ing an additional issue not addressed in the initial memorandums, 
that issue being: "Does a Uniform Real Estate Contract constitute 
a sale of real. property or an executory contract to consummate 
a sale?" 
Both parties submitted memorandum of law with respect 
to this additional issue. On August 6, 1979, the court entered 
its order granting Plaintiffs-Respondents' motion for summary 
judgment and denying Defendants-Appellants' motion for summary 
judgment and motion for attorney fees. It is from this decision 
that Defendants-Appellants now take this appeal. 
Defendants-Appellants do not make any specific assign-
ments of error on appeal. It is assumed, however, that their 
position is either that the court erred in its interpretation 
of the law as it applied to the contract in question or that, 
having interpreted the law correctly, misapplied it to the facts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the decision of the lower 
court reversed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 13, 1978, Respondent C & J Indus' 
Inc., entered into a real estate contract for the purchase ft 
Appellants of 11 lots of real property, more particularly 
described in the contract which is Exhibit "A" to the Cornplai 
(TR. 6-9). 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Respondent 
C & J Industries, Inc., has made monthly installment payment: 
of $2, 297. 31 commencing June 1, 1978, and through and includi 
the present date. The purchase price is $220,000.00 plus 
interest at 9-1/2 per cent per annum. In addition to the 
monthly payments, made prior to Plaintiffs' motion for sununar 
judgment (totalling $27, 567. 72) , Plaintiffs-Respondents have 
also invested approximately $4,000.00 in improvements to the 
subject property. 
On or about March 9, 1979, Respondents sold a smaL 
portion of the property (i.e., 3 of 11 lots) to a third part; 
for a total purchase price of $166,700.00, payable $15,000.m 
down and the balance of $15l,OOO.OO plus interest at 10 per 
cent per annum over an eight-year period in installments of 
$2,300.00 per month. 
Appellants contend that this transfer operated to 
accelerate all future payments under the primary contract. 
Appellants further contend that Respondents' failure to pay( 
the contract (the outstanding balance of which is approximat< 
$213,000.00) constitutes a material breach thereof. 
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Paragraph 3(a) reads as follows: 
In the event Buyer desires to sell or 
assign, ~ransfer or convey Buyer's rights 
under this contract or Buyer's interest 
in said premises, then and in that event, 
the Buyer must pay in full the outstanding 
balance on the contract prior to said 
transaction. 
Some time in April of 1979, and after the transaction 
to which Appellants object, Appellants served upon Respondents 
a notice entitled "Notice to Reinstate the Terms of the 
Contract to Purchase by Payment of All Delinquent Amounts Due 
and owing By Virtue of the Sale of Property Subject to Said 
Contract or Forfeit All Rights Under Said Contract." 
ARGUHENT 
I 
A UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT CONSTITUTES 
A PROMISE TO CONVEY, TRANSFER, SELL OR 
ASSIGN, BUT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A PRESENT 
SALE, ASSIGNMENT, TRANSFER OR CONVEYANCE. 
The law holds that a purchase-money real estate con-
tract such as the one between these parties (TR. 6-9) is an 
executory contract for a sale. It does not constitute a present 
sale, and, therefore, does not trigger the acceleration of 
the contract pursuant to Paragraph 3(a) thereof, and Respondents' 
refusal to pay off the total outstanding balance of the contract 
does not constitute a breach thereof. 
The issue with respect to this particular aspect of 
the case is whether a Uniform Real Estate Contract constitutes 
a sale of real property or an executory contract to consummate 
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a sale. The focal point of that issue is: "What is a sale: 
In that regard, reference can usually be made to Black's Lai 
Dictionary where we find the following definitions: 
A contract between two parties called, 
respectively, the "seller" (or vendor) 
and the "buyer" (or purchaser), by which 
the former, in consideration of the pay-
ment or promise of payment of a certain 
price of money, transfers to the latter, 
the title and possession of property. 
Butler v. Thomson, 92 U.S. 414; 23 L.Ed. 
684. In re Franks Estate, 277 N.Y.S. 573, 
154 Misc. 472 [other citations omitted.] 
A contract whereby property is transferred 
from one person to another for a consider-
ation of value, implying the passin~ of a 
general and absolute title, as distinguished 
from a special interest falling short of 
complete ownership. Arnold v. North Ameri-
can Chemical Co., 232 Mass. 196, 122 N.E. 
283, 284; Falkner v. Town of South Boston, 
140 Va. 517, 127 S .E. 380, 381. (Emphasis 
added.) Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., 
p. 1503. 
In short, it is obvious that a sale constitutes tl. 
transfer of absolute title. In 67 Am.Jur. 2d, "Sale", §8, 
we find a similar statement. 
A sale has been distinguished from a con-
tract to sell. The latter was considered 
a contract whereby the seller agreed to 
transfer the property and goods to the 
buyer for consideration called the price. 
It has been said that under the Uniform 
Sales Act "a sale" implied and involved 
passing of title. Accordingly, there has 
been a material distinction between a 
sale and a mere executory contract for a 
sale. In the case of the former transaction, 
the title to the goods passed to the buyer; 
in the case of the latter, it remained with 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 7 -
the seller. When an executory contract for 
a sale was performed with respect to the 
transfer of title, there was said to be a 
sale or an executed contract for sale. 
The transfer of title as the essential element 
of sale is a principle of law of such an elementary nature 
that the courts have not addressed it on frequent occasion. 
The Utah Supreme Court expressed the principle 36 years ago 
in Union Portland Cement Co. v. State Tax Commission, 110 Ut. 
135, 170 P. 2d 164 (1943). when it observed: "The essence 
of a sale is the transfer of title to goods from the seller 
to the buyer [citations omitted]." 
Although the foregoing two references deal with the 
definition of a "sale" in the context of the transfer of title 
to goods, the principle is the same with respect to real property. 
By its own terms, a uniform real estate contract does 
not permit the transfer of title from the seller to the buyer 
until all of the terms of the contract are performed and all 
of the payments contemplated by the contract are made. Paragraph 
19 of the secondary contract (TR. 10-11) states: 
The Seller on receiving the payments herein 
reserved to be paid at the time and in the 
manner above-mentioned, agrees to execute 
and deliver to the Buyer or assigns, a good 
and sufficient warranty deed conveying the 
title to the above-described premises free 
and clear of encumbrances •• 
In addition to the fact that there has been no transfer 
of title from Respondents a third party of the real property 
here in question, it is also helpful to consider the other 
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language of the contract (TR. 10-11). For example, Paragraph 
2 states: 
That Seller, for the consideration herein 
mentioned, agrees to sell and convey to 
the buyer, and the buyer for the consider-
ation herein mentioned, agrees to purchase 
the following described real property .•. 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is noteworthy that the language does not state· 
"the Seller hereby sells and conveys to the Buyer, and the B. 
hereby purchases the following described real property". Th! 
language is prospective. 
Again, turning to Black's Law Dictionary, we find 
the following: 
An executory sale is one which has been 
definitely agreed on as to terms and condi-
tions which have not yet been carried into 
full effect in respect to some of its terms 
and details, as where it remains to deter-
mine the price, quantity or identity of the 
things sold, or to a installments of ur-
chase money, or to effect a delivery. Cita-
tions omitted.] (Emphasis added.) Black's 
Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., p. 1504. See also 
Universal Sales Corp. v. California Press 
Mfg, Co., 128 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1942). 
Obviously, in this case the contract in question hi 
not yet been carried into full effect as there remains the 
obligation to pay installments of purchase money; consequent: 
this contract constitutes an executory contract for the sale 
as opposed to a completed sale. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 9 -
In the case of Noto v. Blasco, 198 So. 429 (1940), 
the plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase three lots 
of real property from Defendant. Plaintiff made a partial 
payment of $50.00 on the total contract price of $1,700.00. 
Defendant later prevailed upon plaintiff to release him from 
his contract to sell the lots. Plaintiff alleged that he 
was induced to release the contract on account of fraudulent 
misrepresentations of the defendant. He prayed for damages 
in an amount equal to the difference between his contract 
price and the higher price for which the property was sold 
by the defendant shortly after plaintiff gave his release. 
The court concluded that if the contract between the parties 
constituted a sale, then plaintiff could recover the benefit 
of his bargain (i.e., the difference between his contract and 
the contract by which the property ultimately sold). On the 
other hand, in the event the contract was not a sale but only 
a promise to sell, the plaintiff could only recover the partial 
payments made by him. Regarding this issue, the court 
stated, 
An agreement for the sale of real estate, 
which contemplates the passing of the 
property (or title) not immediately and 
by virtue of the agreement, but by an 
act to be executed at a later date, and 
which contains all of the elements of the 
sale, such as the price, the property and 
the consent of the parties, is merely a 
promise of sale, unless the intention of 
the parties clearly indicates that the 
agreement itself constitutes a completed 
sale. 
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As there was no completed sale, and as the 
parties contemplated the completion of the 
sale in the future by the execution of a 
deed transferring the ownership, the con-
tract in this case, according to the follow-
ing cases, must be construed as a contract 
or promise of sale and not a completed sale, 
and the amount deposited must be considered 
as earnest money, and the purchaser limited 
to the recovery of the earnest money. 
[Citations omitted.] Ibid 432. 
The third party contract (TR. 10-11) is an executor 
contract which contemplates the passing of title eight years 
hence when all of the terms of the contract shall be complet! 
Until that time, there has been no sale, and the acceleration 
clause of Paragraph 3(a) of the primary contract does not 
beccome operative under the facts of this case. 
The foregoing argument applies primarily to the 
operational effect of Paragraph 3(a) as it relates to the 
transaction between Respondents and a third party (TR. 10-
11). Appellants, however, have raised a new issue and a new 
argument on appeal. Appellants argue that, 
The court must assume a sale, assignment 
or conveyance of C & J Industries, Inc.'s 
rights or interests to Glade N. James and 
A. Robert Collins in order for them to 
enter the contract executed by them on 
March 9, 1979 (Exhibit "B" p. 10). If 
there was a sale, assignment or convey-
ance by C & J Industries, Inc., to Glade 
N. James and A. Robert Collins, then it 
was a breach of Paragraph 3(a). Appellants' 
Brief, 8. 
This argument is not one which Respondents now 
address because it was not plead, argued or subrni tted in anY 
... 
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fashion in the court below. The Court has repeatedly held 
and recognized that it will not consider a matter raised for 
the first time on appeal. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 
(Ut. 1977); State by and through Road Commission v. Larkin, 
27 Ut. 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Ut.2d 
358, 431 P.2d 788 (1967); Hamilton v. Salt Lake County Sewerage 
Improvement District No. 1, 15 Ut.2d, 260 P.2d 235 (1964); 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 13 Ut.2d 397, 375 P.2d 456 (1962i; 
Carson v. Douglas, 12 Ut.2d 424, 367 P.2d 462 (1962). 
II 
EVEN IF THE THIRD PARTY CONTRACT TRANSACTION 
IN THIS CASE WERE CONSIDERED TO BE A PRESENT 
SALE, THE TRANSFER OF A SMALL PORTION OF THE 
TOTAL REAL PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE PRIMARY 
CONTRACT DOES NOT ACCELERATE PAYMENTS UNDER 
THE CONTRACT OR VIOLATE THE PROVISIONS OF 
PARAGRAPH 3(a) THEREOF. 
As mentioned, Paragraph 3(a) requires the buyer 
to pay off the contract in full in the event the buyer desires 
to transfer "Buyer's rights" under the contract. It is 
Respondents' contention and understanding the the broad langu-
age in question requires the contract to be paid in full in 
the event the buyer transfers all its rights under the 
contract. Appellants, on the other hand maintain that the 
language imposes an obligation to pay off the contract if 
any of the buyer's rights were transferred or any of the 
property sold, however small. 
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The construction of the language in contracts requ: 
that the words be given their ordinary meaning, i.e., the 
meaning which they would convey to reasonable men. 17 Arn.Jui 
"Contracts" §§243, 247. 
Stated in slightly different words, the 
language and acts of a party to a contract 
are to receive such a construction as at 
the time he supposed the other party would 
given to them or such a construction as 
the other party was fairly justified in 
giving to them and he will not at a later 
time be permitted to give them a different 
o eration in conse uence of some mental 
reservation. §248:641 Emphasis added • 
The words "Buyer's rights" without specific limi-
tation or reservation denote the meaning of "all rights". 
Normally, words are thought to describe the whole unless oth; 
wise stated. A granter, for example, is said to convey all 
property described in the document of conveyance unless a Pfil 
cular portion thereof is specifically reserved. Similarly, 
"Buyer's rights" reasonably means all rights possessed by th; 
buyer unless more narrowly or specifically defined. Had the 
parties agreed to a more narrow term in this regard, it wouli 
have been a simple and logical matter to have stated, 
In the event Buyer desires to sell or 
assign, transfer or convey any of Buyer's 
rights under this contract or Buyer's 
interest in said premises, then and in 
that event the Buyer must pay in full 
the outstanding balance due on this 
contract prior to said transaction. 
(Additional words underlined.) 
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The interpretation placed upon this language by 
Appellants flies in the teeth of reasonableness. Appellants 
maintain that the term in question would be violated and 
consequently a material breach of the contract would result 
upon the transfer or conveyance of any right of the buyer, 
however small or insignificant. This would require the payment 
of the entire unpaid balance of the contract if the buyer 
were to convey to a neighboring property owner a one-foot 
strip on which the neighbor could place a fence. Such an 
interpretation is not reasonable and does not serve the purpose 
it was originally designated to accommodate. 
Although Respondents believe that the language in 
question is clear and denotes "all" of buyer's rights under 
the contract, Respondents also contend, in the alternative, 
that at the very worst the language is ambiguous. Assuming 
ambiguity for the sake of argument, the ambiguous language 
must be construed strictly against the drafter -- in this 
case it is the Appellants. 
Wingets, Inc. v. Bitters, 28 Ut.2d 231, 500 P.2d 
1007 (1972) was an action by the seller of real property 
against the buyers for recovery of the balance due on the contract 
price which seller had declared "immediately due and payable" 
on the ground that buyers were in default. The court stated 
that forfeiture is not favored in the law and that the buyers 
were entitled to the most favorable interpretation that 
could be placed upon the forfeiture provision by a person Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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of ordinary intelligence and understanding, and in light 
of existing circumstances. In ruling against the seller, tht 
court applied the general rule of law that the provisions of 
the contract should be construed most strictly against the 
party who drafted the contract. See also Wells Fargo Bank 
N.A. v. Midwest Realty & Finance, Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (1975): 
Wagstaff v. Reinco, Inc., 540 P.2d 931 (1975). 
In this particular instance, Appellants, or their 
attorney, drafted the contract in question, and therefore, it 
provisions (in particular Paragraph 3 (a) ) should be construei 
strictly against them and resolved in favor of Respondents, 
declaring the language to refer to the transfer of all buyer' 
rights. 
Appellants contend in their brief that they do not 
seek a forfeiture in this case; it should be noted, however, 
that as previously mentioned the Appellants served upon Res· 
pendents a Notice to Reinstate Terms of Contract to Purchase 
by Payment of All Delinquent Amounts Due and Owing by Virtue 
of the Sale of the Property Subject to said Contract or ~ 
All Rights Under Said Contract. (Emphasis added.) Furtherm: 
in the event the payments under the primary contract were 
accelerated and Respondents were required to pay off the out· 
standing balance (approximately $213,000.00), it could well 
be that Respondents would be unable to pay off the outstand· 
ing balance, in which case Appellants' only viable remedy woul 
be to seek a forfeiture. 
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III 
EVEN TAKING APPELLANTS' POSITION THAT 
RESPONDEN'l'S BREACHED THE CONTRACT, THE 
"BREACH" WAS OF l>. MINOR NATURE AND DOES 
NOT EQUITABLY JUSTIFY AN ACCELERATION. 
It is a well established principle of law that 
although a minor breach gives rise to an immediate cause of 
action for damages caused by the breach, it does not give rise 
to a cause of action for breach of the entire contract as 
urged by the Appellants. Viewing this principle from another 
perspective -- from the point of view of what has been done 
under the contract as opposed to what was not done -- the 
same principle is expressed as the doctrine of "substantial 
performance" which is simply the mirror image of the "minor-
breach doctrine." It looks to the spirit of the contract 
and not the letter of it. 
The question is not whether there has been a literal 
compliance, but whether there has been a substantial performance. 
This has long been the rule in equity. Accordingly, substantial 
and not exact performance accompanied by good faith is all the 
law requires in the case of any contract to entitle a party 
to recover on it. 
Although a plaintiff is not absolutely free 
from fault or omission in every particular, the 
court will not turn him away if he has in good 
faith made substantial performance, but will 
enforce his rights on the one hand and pre-
serve the rights of the defendant on the other, 
by permitting a recoupment. 17 Am.Jur.2d 
"Contracts" §375:818. 
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This rule of law prevents the inequities of forfei 
where there has been substantial compliance while preservin~ 
the injured party's right to recover damages for the minor 
breach. It is important to note, however, that Appellants 
have not been damaged in any degree as a result of the 
contract to sell the three lots. 
The question now becomes: "What is 'substantial 
performance' , or what constitutes a 'minor breach'?" The 
answer is provided by the Restatement of the Law of Contract 
§275, pp. 402, 403. The Restatement lists six factors to be 
taken into consideration in determining whether a breach is 
material or minor in nature. The text of §275 is: 
In determining the materiality of a failure 
to fully perform a promise, the following 
circumstances are influential. 
(a) The extent to which the injured party 
will obtain the substantial benefit which 
he would have reasonably anticipated; ••• 
Appellants as sellers of the property are entitled 
primarily to receive payment for their property in the amoun· 
and at the intervals set forth in the contract ($220,000.00 
at $2,297.31 per month with 9-1/2 per cent interest). That 
benefit has not been interrupted and is secure. It has not 
been jeopardized in the least as a result of the alleged 
"breach" of which Appellants complain. 
(b) The extent to which the injured party 
may be adequately compensated in damages 
for lack of complete performance; .•• Id. 
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Here again, while Appellants may argue that they have 
a cause of action for the contract to sell three lots, they 
have not been damaged in the least as a result thereof. 
(c) The extent to which the party failing 
to perform has already performed or made 
preparations for performance. Id. 
The official comments to §275 state that, 
[W]here the failure is at the outset, a 
very slight failure is often sufficient to 
discharge the injured party. But even in 
that case, and more obviously if the failure 
of a promissor occurs after part performance 
by him, the question becomes one of degree. 
Both the amount that he has done and the 
benefit that the injured party has received 
are to be considered. Id. 403. 
In this instance there has been substantial per-
formance. Respondents have faithfully made the payments re-
quired by the contract, not to mention some $45,000.00 
invested in inprovements on the property. 
(d) The greater or lesser hardship on the 
party failing to perform and terminating 
the contract; • • • Id. 
In this regard the official comments are as follows: 
The question then to be answered is: Will 
it be more conformable to justice in the 
particular case to free the injured party 
[of the contract] or, on the other hand, 
to require him to perform his promise, in 
both cases giving him a right of action 
if the failure to perform was wrongful. 
Id. 403. 
As indicated before, Respondents will suffer a 
severe hardship in having to pay the outstanding balance on 
the contract (presently approximately $213,000.00), which 
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constitutes the price for all 11 lots because Respondents 
sold 3 of them. The hardship becomes especially onerous by 
the fact that the proceeds from the 3-lot sale are not in 
hand but are to be received by contract over a period of 
8 years. Also, there would be a substantial charge to 
Respondents for increased rates of interest of Respondents 
have to borrow money to pay off the $213,000.00. 
In the event Respondents cannot obtain adequate 
financing to pay off the contract, Appellants will suffer 
the property to be foreclosed by judicial sale or forfeiture 
and Respondents will stand to lose most or all of their inve 
ment. 
(e) The willful, negligent or innocent 
behavior of the party failing to perform;. 
Id. 
In the present instance, Respondents never underst 
nor do they now understand or believe, that the contract in 
question required them to pay off the outstanding balance 
in the event any portion of the property, however small, 
were sold to a third party. Certainly it cannot be said tha· 
the contract to sell 3 lots to a third party was a willful 
contravention of the primary contract. 
(f) The greater or lesser uncertainty that 
the party failing to perform will perform 
the remainder of the contract. Id. 
Respondents have faithfully performed their obli· 
gations under the contract to date and will continue to do 
so in the future. 
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It is clear from the foregoing principles that the 
alleged wrong is not material to the contract. Appellants 
stand to receive the full benefit bargained for under the con-
tract; they have not been damaged as a result of the alleged 
wrong; Respondents have substantially performed and would incur 
great hardship if the contract were terminated by the acceler-
ation of payments; the contract to sell 3 lots in question 
was not done in willful disregard of the terms of the primary 
contract; and there exists no uncertainty as to the prospect 
of future performance by Respondents. 
In Krentz v. Johnson, 343 N.E.2d 165 (Ill. C.A., 1976), 
the court considered an action by purchasers of real property 
seeking specific performance of the contract which had been 
declared forfeited by sellers for a default of a single payment. 
The court observed that the sum of $11,000.00 plus interest had 
been paid on the original contract price of $27,500.00. The 
buyers had also made substantial improvements on the property 
and had affected re-zoning of the entire property showing 
expenditures in the amount of $22,500.00. The default declared 
amounted to $182.81. On that basis, sellers attempted to fore-
close the contract. The court stated, 
It has been stated generally, as defendants 
contend, that where a forfeiture has been 
declared in the manner prescribed in the 
contract the court will give effect to it. 
[Citations omitted.] It would appear, 
however, that the cases give effect to this 
rule when the result is not essentially 
unfair to either party. The equally 
familiar rule is that forfeitures are not 
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favored by courts of equity and that parties 
will be relieved from a technical forfeiture 
of rights under a contract if injustice 
results from its enforcement. 
Another case dealing with the same principle is 
Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis v. Williamson, 
545 F.2d 76 (8th Cir., 1976). This case involved two corpor· 
ations, one of which acquired the other. The acquired 
company amended its employee pension trust so as to require 
assets to the trust to be transferred to the acquiring compai 
The acquiring company agreed to make all former employees of 
the acquired company eligible to participate in the new 
company's plan. Obviously, the intent was to benefit the 
acquired company's former employees. The acquiring company, 
however, did not fully comply in that it included only 112 of 
117 employees of the former company in its own pension plan. 
The court found that the new company had "substantially 
performed" its obligation to include the former employer's 
employees in its own pension plan and, therefore, refused 
to deprive the new company of the entire fund. 
As in Krentz and Northwestern National, supra, the 
Respondents in this case have substantially performed all 
of their obligations under the contract in queston; there-
fore, the contract should be enforced to allow them to 
continue to make regular monthly payments for the purchase 
of the property and to retain the possession, use and enjoyirt· 
thereof pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
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IV 
APPELLANTS' POSITION WOULD WORK AN UNCON-
SCIONABLE RESULT TO RESPONDENTS' INTEREST. 
Appellants maintain that "according to value", 75 per 
cent of the property sold by Appellants to Respondents has now 
been sold by Respondents to a third party. Appellants' Brief, 
p. 21. That assertion is fallacious in that it compares apples 
with oranges. Appellants are comparing the contract price 
between these parties with the contract price between Respondents 
and the third party. The fact is that only 3 of the 11 lots 
involved are the subject of the second contract. Appellants' 
position is also blind to the fact that Respondents have not 
received a lump sum of money in hand but that the contract price 
is to be paid out over a period of time (8 years). 
Contrary to Appellants' assertion that no claim of 
unconscionability has been raised (Appellants' Brief, p. 21), 
Respondents argued in each memorandum submitted below that 
they will suffer a severe hardship in having to pay the 
outstanding balance on the contract (approximately $213,000.00), 
which constitutes the price for all 11 lots. That burden 
becomes more onerous by the fact that there would be a sub-
stantial charge to Respondents for the now higher rates of 
interest that Respondents would have to pay in order to obtain 
sufficient financing to pay off the contract. 
Appellants' position is simply untenable. At the 
outset, they have asserted that Paragraph 3(a) of the contract 
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the entire unpaid balance of the contract if they were to se 
to a third party any portion of the 11 lots in question. Gi 
that interpretation, if the Respondents were to sell a one·f'. 
parcel of any of the property, the acceleration would operat: 
Appellants have now taken the argument an addition: 
step further. With respect to the language of Paragraph 3(a 
which states in part that: "In the event Buyer desires to Si 
assign, transfer or convey Buyer's rights. • • " Appellants 
now claim that the acceleration clause is triggered the momi: 
the Respondents thought of the idea of selling the property: 
any portion thereof to a third party. Thus, not only must 
Respondents pay the full contract price in the event they se 
any portion of the property, they must do so the moment the 
idea pops into their heads. It simply cannot be said that 
such an interpretation is reasonable or remotely similar to 
what the parties contemplated when they entered into these 
transactions. 
v 
APPELLANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING 
RESPONDENTS' ALLEGED "BREACH". 
It is widely recognized that a default in the 
performance of the contract may be waived and the injured 
party may accept or insist on performance after such breach 
of the contract. "The acceptance of the benefit under the 
contract with the knowledge of a breach thereof ordinarily 
constitutes a waiver of the wrong." 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contract! 
§447:908-910. 
-
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After Respondents received Appellants' 30-day notice 
of termination and cancellation of the contract, Appellants 
continued to demand that the subsequent monthly payments be 
made. Respondents complied; they have made all regular monthly 
payments to date as demanded and accepted by Appellants. 
Respondents urge, therefore, that Appellants have elected 
to continue to accept performance by Respondents according 
to the terms of the contract and have thereby waived their 
right to assert the .alleged breach of contract arising out 
of the contract to sell the 3 lots to the third party, 
VI 
APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD 
FOR ATTORNEY FEES. 
Appellants maintain that they are entitled to an 
award for attorney fees arising out of the present action. 
Appellants' petition for attorney fees should be denied on 
the basis of any one or all of the following reasons: 
1. There has been no event of default or breach 
on the part of Respondents under the terms of the contract 
between these parties. In this regard, reference should be 
made not only to the arguments set forth in the briefs, 
but also to those set forth in the memorandums filed in support 
of the motions for summary judgment heard below. 
2. Appellants failed to file a counterclaim 
seeking affirmative relief which would have provided the 
basis for seeking an award of attorney fees. 
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3. Appellants have maintained throughout these 
proceedings that it is an action to enforce a contract and 
not an action for breach and forfeiture. For the purpose 
of this argument, assuming that there has been a "sale" as 
contemplated by Paragraph 3 (a) of the primary contract, such 
a "sale" would not constitute a default. It would merely tri 
acceleration of payments, a term of the contract. Respondent 
however, maintain that no event has occurred which constitute 
a "sale" or which would accelerate payments under the primari 
contract in any event. 
4. This is an action for a declaratory judgment 
and not one for affirmative relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The provisions of Paragraph 3(a) of the primary 
contract have not been violated by Respondents. There has 
been no sale of property. 
Even assuming that a Uniform Real Estate Contract 
were construed to be a consummated sale, still there has been 
no violation of Paragraph 3 (a) because that provision does nc 
contemplate the conveyance, sale or transfer of simply a smal 
portion of the "Buyer's rights". Reasonably constructed, 
that paragraph leads one to conclude that it relates to the 
transfer, sale or conveyance of all of "Buyer's rights". 
At the very worst, Paragraph 3(a) is ambiguous as 
to its intent and must be construed strictly against the 
Appellants inasmuch as they are the drafters of the contract. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 25 -
Even if one assumes further that Paragraph 3(a) is 
triggered by the conveyance, sale or transfer of any portion of 
the subject real property, Respondents have substantially per-
formed all of their obligations under the contract, and under 
the "minor-breach doctrine", the alleged wrong is not mater-
ial to the contract. 
Although a minor breach would give rise to an immedi-
ate cause of action for damages (which are nil in this case), 
it does not give rise to a cause of action for breach of the 
entire contract as urged by the Appellants. Appellants stand 
to receive the full benefit bargained for under the contract; 
they have not been damaged as a result of the alleged wrong; 
Respondents have substantially performed and would incur great 
hardship if the contract were terminated by the acceleration 
of payments; and there exists no uncertainty as to the prospect 
of future performance by Respondents. 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully 
petition this court to affirm the decision of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JENSEN & rrs, P.~. 
M~/~~ ~IS/. u_t.h' 30, East, Suite l ~ s ake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the 
foregoing Respondents' Brief to T. Quentin Cannon, Attorney 
for Appellants, 510 Ten Broadway Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 13th day of December, 1979, postage prepaid. 
• 
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